Why Isn't the Closure of a U.S. Military Base Cause for Celebration? The Asia-Pacific Context
by Andrew Yeo
Following the Pentagon’s 2004 Global Posture Review (GPR), which calls for reconfiguring U.S. overseas basing structure and repositioning U.S. military manpower, activists, policymakers, and scholars have focused attention on the politics of overseas U.S. military bases. This interest stems partially from the political nature of military bases faced by host governments. As one Pentagon official stated, “We seek to transform our defense relationships, our presence and footprint overseas to better deal with the post-9/11 strategic landscape.”
The GPR signifies reductions in U.S. troops for countries in the Asia-Pacific, most notably South Korea and Japan (Okinawa). However, far from reducing the level of anti-base activity, in several instances base closures and proposed troop cuts have surprisingly had the contrary effect of enflaming anti-base protests. While these decisions have satisfied some host governments, such as South Korea and Japan, why are activists shouting louder than ever? Additionally, what do recent reactions from anti-base movements regarding global military realignment in the Asia-Pacific tell us about the character of movements in this region?
In 2002, Seoul and Washington concluded negotiations aimed at reducing U.S. troop levels by approximately 8,000 troops by 2008. The U.S. also announced the closure and consolidation of most U.S. installations between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the North and South Korean border, and ceded to South Korea’s request to relocate United States Forces, Korea (USFK) headquarters out of Seoul. In 2005, Tokyo and Washington finalized a deal which would eventually close the long-contested Futenma Air Station and proposed a phased withdrawal of 7,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
To some degree, anti-base activists, particularly those residing near U.S. facilities, do welcome troop withdrawals and base closures since this reduces potential social costs. Protest against negative externalities — such as crime, prostitution, safety hazards, or pollution associated with U.S. military presence — are a staple of movement demands across Asia. Indeed, if we understand anti-base movements as simply a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) movement, local communities should claim victory upon the removal of U.S. military presence.
Yet for many anti-base activists, each victory is only partial and bittersweet. Base closure often means relocating troops and bases to some other nearby location, either within the same country, or elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific.
For instance, after the closure of Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri in 2005, USFK and South Korean officials prepared to modernize the air-to-surface firing range on Jikdo Island, in another part of the country. South Korean anti-base activists also criticized the relocation of USFK headquarters from Yongsan, Seoul, lamenting that the move 50 miles south to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek only exported the problems. Most urgent for Korean activists is the ongoing displacement of farmers living on the designated land expansion site of Camp Humphreys
In Okinawa, the closure of Futenma and relocation of 7,000 Marines to Guam was attached to the condition that a replacement facility would be provided for United States Forces, Japan (USFJ) within Okinawa. Currently, Tokyo and Washington have agreed to build the facility at Camp Schwab in northeastern Okinawa.
Aggravating activists is the lack of transparency and the perception that local input is ignored when Seoul, Tokyo, or Manila enter base policy negotiations with Washington. Activists engaged in current protests in Asia — including the relocation of Yongsan and the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, the relocation of Futenma in Okinawa, and the return of U.S. troops in Mindanao under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in the Philippines — have all criticized their governments’ lack of transparency with the process of force realignment. Although Pentagon officials have declared that a purpose of force realignment is to ease the burden on local communities, activists remain skeptical, retorting that such decisions are designed to meet U.S. strategic interests, not community concerns.
Two principles fundamental to anti-base activists in the Asia-Pacific, peace and nationalism, suggest why base closures and relocation have been met with only muted celebration. Interestingly, these principles also facilitate networking across geography and cultures.
While local issues of justice are always associated with anti-base movements, it would be incorrect to identify these movements simply as NIMBY phenomena. More broadly, anti-base movements are motivated by peace and sovereignty. The anti-base movement in the Philippines in the 1980s and early 1990s was fueled largely by the nation’s nuclear-free movement. Okinawans most visibly opposed to U.S. military presence have been people who experienced the Battle of Okinawa. Thus, the urgency fueling anti-base mobilization in these countries does not subside with the relocation of bases and troops. To many activists, bases are viewed as instruments of war and U.S. military aggression. Therefore, as they have begun to network in transnational solidarity, moving bases “out of our backyard” merely shifts the externalities associated with bases to “my neighbor’s backyard.” Goals of peace and demilitarization are not satisfied under these conditions.
The global anti-base movement may be framed as a peace movement, but what makes the movement in the Asia-Pacific somewhat distinct, particularly to those in Europe, is the salience of nationalism. Colonial legacies in the Asia-Pacific are one reason why nationalism and sovereignty rights play a pivotal role. For example, the legacy of foreign domination by Spain and the U.S. in the collective memory of Filipinos provides anti-base movements with frames when organizing. Even prior to the formation of anti-base coalitions, nationalist politicians such as Claro Recto, Jose Diokno, and Lorenzo Tanada spoke out against U.S. bases, claiming that they served as symbolic reminders that the Philippines had not yet attained sovereignty from its former colonial master.
South Korea experienced colonization under the Japanese when Japan annexed Korea in 1910. The Japanese attempted to obliterate Korean culture and identity by forcing Koreans to adopt Japanese names, banning literature printed in Korean, making Japanese the primary language in schools, and drafting thousands of Koreans into the military during its conquest of Manchuria and Southeast Asia. It comes as no surprise, then, that Japanese colonial rule strengthened Korean nationalism. Likewise, Japan’s annexation of the Ryuku Kingdom as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879 and its brutality of forced conscription in World War II have left an imprint on the collective memory of Okinawans. Hence, protests against U.S. bases in Okinawa are not only campaigns directed against Tokyo and Washington, but for some, also an assertion of Okinawan identity.
In sum, colonial legacies in the Asia-Pacific enable movement leaders to frame anti-base issues through sovereignty or nationalist frames, by evoking readily-available symbols that link bases to past violations of national sovereignty. Additionally, movement leaders can use local grievances related to U.S. bases to expand their national goals within the broader context of sovereignty.
Significant changes in U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific are well underway. Army and Marine units from South Korea and Okinawa dispatched to Iraq will most likely return to the U.S. mainland under Northern Command. Units in the 2nd Infantry Division are making the transition to Camp Humphreys. U.S. forces continue to enter in and out of the Philippines as part of joint training and military exercises.
The overall reduction of U.S. troops in Asia is welcomed by anti-base activists, but the GPR and military transformation continues to present new challenges. The expansion of major installations, such as Camp Humphreys and Camp Schwab, and frequent “visits” by U.S. troops in the Philippines suggests that U.S. forces plan to remain in these areas for the long run. As one activist lamented about Camp Humphreys, “The new base will be a state-of-the-art facility which is built to last for the next 100 years.” Thus, under the overarching banners of peace, sovereignty, and nationalism, we should not expect anti-base movements in the Asia-Pacific to dissipate anytime soon either.
Andrew Yeo is a Ph.D. candidate in government at Cornell University. His research focuses on the social movements, alliances, and political components of U.S. military bases overseas.
