Panama Update Archives
X. Conclusions and Recommendations
I. Introduction
II. Brief History of Chemical Weapons Programs in Panama
III. Storage of Chemical Agents and Munitions
IV. Chemical Weapons Tests
V. Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions
VI. Potential Long-Term Dangers Posed by Abandoned Chemical Weapons
VII. Information and Documents on Chemical Weapons: The U.S. Record
VIII. Legal Obligations
IX. Alleged development of biological agents in Panama
X. Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendices
Endnotes In 1979, the United States was prepared — if requested by the Government of Panama — to conduct a survey of San Jose Island to "determine the bounds of chemical contamination on the island and assess the feasibility of returning it to a 'safe for normal habitation' condition." The survey plan, developed by the Pentagon, would have taken eight to ten days, followed by an assessment of "an unspecified longer period dependent upon survey findings." 108 (This and all subsequent endnotes can be found here.) Panama did not request the survey.
At non-stockpile chemical weapons sites across the United States, including sites of buried chemical munitions, the U.S. government has been prepared to not only assess contamination left by chemical weapons activities, but to conduct clean-up of those sites. These are not technically impossible tasks. The United States can and should carry them out in Panama.
The CWC is a brand new legal instrument, whose driving force is the elimination of all chemical weapons. The United States, Panama, the private sector, and ordinary states all will benefit from the Convention's success. In that spirit, the United States should avoid an overly technical application of the convention's provisions in favor of a forward-looking approach. The United States has a unique historical opportunity to demonstrate its good faith and leadership in ridding the world of chemical weapons.
In addition, both the United States and Panama, as well as investors and communities in Panama, have a stake in ensuring that the former chemical sites in the canal area, San Jose Island and Rio Hato are safe areas for people to live and work. Without such an assurance, the transition to the successful Panamanian management of the canal area will be hindered by doubt and potential hazards to human health and safety.
Recommendations:
To the Government of the United States:
1) That the United States State Department fully disclose to the Government of Panama all information relating to sites where chemical munitions and agents, including duds, may have been abandoned. The information should include copies of original documents, where possible, and address chemical agents on the land surface, dumped at sea or buried underground, both inside and outside the Panama Canal area.
2) That the United States commit the resources necessary to safely and promptly dispose of chemical weapons and agents it abandoned in Panama. This disposal should include San Jose Island as well as burial sites, especially those sites within the canal area which fall under the requirements of the Panama Canal Treaty. Such sites are a time bomb awaiting road construction, housing developments, reforestation, or other activities that lead people to excavate areas where the U.S. has left live chemical munitions.
3) That the United States increase resources, including budget and qualified staff, for the documentary history of chemical weapons programs operated by the United States, and make such resources accessible under reasonable conditions to representatives of civil society. This should include, for example, increased staff for the technical libraries and funds for preservation of documents at Aberdeen and Dugway Proving Grounds, expansion of Aberdeen Proving Ground's technical library hours, and cooperation with the National Archives and Records Administration and with researchers in gaining access to these sources.
To the Government of Panama:
1) That the Government of Panama follow ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention with a report within 30 days to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Warfare, as required by the CWC.
2) That the Panamanian government promote and support the establishment of a repository of resources and documents on the history of use of U.S. military sites in Panama. The Panamanian government should make these documents available to the Panamanian public, possibly through the University of Panama, Technology University, or the Catholic University (USMA).
To potential investors in Panama:
That potential investors support Panama's aspirations for a safe and healthy environment by investing in dignified work by Panamanians in the interoceanic region and by supporting Panamanian diplomatic efforts for decontamination of areas affected by past chemical warfare programs.
To the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada:
That the British and Canadian governments disclose to Panama documents on chemical weapons activities in Panama (particularly on San Jose Island), as a contribution to implementation of the CWC.
TEST TUBE REPUBLIC: Chemical Weapons Tests in Panama and U.S. Responsibility
I. Introduction
II. Brief History of Chemical Weapons Programs in Panama
III. Storage of Chemical Agents and Munitions
IV. Chemical Weapons Tests
V. Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions
VI. Potential Long-Term Dangers Posed by Abandoned Chemical Weapons
VII. Information and Documents on Chemical Weapons: The U.S. Record
VIII. Legal Obligations
IX. Alleged development of biological agents in Panama
X. Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendices
Endnotes
[Fellowship of Reconciliation Homepage] [FOR Panama Campaign]
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Panama Campaign
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- Last updated August 7, 1998. NVWeb, Philadelphia USA
