FOR: Panamá Update, Spring-Summer 1996

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Panama Campaign
FOR Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean
2017 Mission St. #305, San Francisco, CA 94110
Tel: (415) 495-6334, Fax: (415) 495-5628, E-mail: forlatam@igc.apc.org

Drug War Heats Up in Panama
State Dept issues threats, US Forces Authorized to Enter Colombian Border Area

The Panamanian government agreed in April to allow the United States to conduct military training in airspace over Panama's jungle border area with Colombia in April. The agreement came in the wake of undocumented claims that Colombian guerrillas had stepped up activity in the area. "These are not the first exercises, and they surely will not be the last," deputy Foreign Minister Erich Rodr'guez said. Panamanian officials emphasized, however, that guerrillas had not entered Panamanian territory.

The Southern Command (SouthCom) denied that troops had gone to the border province of Darién or that any such deployment was planned, contradicting repeated declarations by the Foreign Ministry and Interior Minister Raœl Montenegro. U.S. officials insisted that military flights had been planned, but were cancelled at the last minute because of equipment problems.

The authorization to send Air Force jets followed threats by a State Department official that if Panama "does not take vigorous steps to clean up its financial sector, it will become more difficult for the United States to back international financial activity through that country." Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters Robert Gelbard also told reporters that Panama is "at great risk" of drug cartels "taking power" after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1999. Ambassador Hughes claimed in a hearing before Panama's legislative assembly on April 8 that the Darién province that borders Colombia hosts 200 secret air strips and that the cartels continue to launder money in Panama, but he gave no evidence for the claims.

Meanwhile, SouthCom in Panama quietly announced that military training teams had been sent from Panama to "allied countries" in the last week of April, to train Latin American soldiers and anti-drug police in land and water-borne tactics. SouthCom also said it had increased surveillance flights and the use of mobile land radars in the region.

International media have added fuel to the debate. An article in the May 25 Economist suggests that Panama's ruling Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) is linked to the recent collapse of a Panamanian bank and the arrest in April of a Colombian accused of money laundering in Panama. Editorials and coverage of Panama's proposed amnesty law have portrayed the PRD government as continuing the legacy of corruption from the Noriega era (see article, p. 5).

The scare generated by the troop authorization, together with increased election-year rhetoric about drugs, are greasing the skids for talks between the U.S. and Panama about keeping military bases in Panama beyond 1999, when the Panama Canal Treaties call for their withdrawal. Within days of public reports of U.S. troops being deployed to the Panamanian jungle, officials "at the highest level" from the White House, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department met to consider the future of the bases. A U.S. military officer interviewed by La Prensa in late May claimed that talks are going forward informally and in secret.

The authorization of exercises and statements by U.S. officials thus served two interventionist purposes: to pressure the Colombian administration of President Samper, and to tell Panama that its own police forces can't handle security within its borders. By evoking the image of money laundering conduits, clandestine airstrips and guerrilla invasions, it becomes easier to sell a continued bellicose presence of U.S. forces. While it would be inaccurate to interpret these developments as outright provocations, they are a political prod to Panama to request an extension U.S. military forces for security reasons.

Panamanians Defend Their Record

Panamanian officials responded heatedly. President Pérez Balladares called the State Department's assertions "senseless" at a meeting of European and Latin American leaders in Bolivia in April, saying the comments were "meant to get an advantage" for the United States in military base negotiations. He said that what is important is the decision to fight drug trafficking, with or without the U.S. military bases.

Perhaps responding also to a precipitous drop in Panamanian popular support for keeping the bases (see box), Pérez Balladares also declared that he will "never" request an extended U.S. military presence. "There must be a direct economic benefit, perfectly measurable, and the United States [must] ask" for a base agreement, he said on April 23.

National Security Director Gabriel Castro said that laundered money comes into Panama through U.S. banks, not through the jungle in Darién province, but that Panama is doing its utmost to combat that problem. He added that Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian strongman sentenced to 40 years in a Florida prison for drug trafficking, "did not become a dictator by means of the drug trade, but as an employee of the CIA."

Only weeks before, the director of Panama's border police, Jaime Ruiz, said that the number of undocumented people entering Panama from Colombia had been reduced considerably because of the security that police provide in the area. In January, a "high US official" told El Panamá América that Panama is fulfilling its part "to the letter" in the continental struggle against drug trafficking. The official credited President Pérez Balladares and Panama's own "drug czar" Gabriel Castro with acting energetically and successfully against drug trafficking.

The Colombian Senate protested the authorization of military flights in the border area as a violation of Colombian air space. Colombian Senator Alvaro Uribe said that "an intervention like what happened in Panama or in Grenada" is possible, and called for stronger action by his government.

The United States has been openly hostile to the embattled Colombian administration of Ernesto Samper, whose efforts against drug trafficking the U.S. "decertified" in early March. The decertification resulted in a suspension of U.S. anti-drug aid, as well as votes by the United States against aid and credits to Colombia from multilateral banks. The certification process has been condemned by Latin American and European governments for being unilateral and setting a standard that the United States itself, as the largest consumer of illegal drugs, would not pass. Panama's anti-drug program was "certified" in the annual State Department report.

Colombian guerrillas denied they had entered Panamanian territory, and in fact the rumor of their presence came from an unauthenticated anonymous letter. In an ironic note to the Panamanian government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia said, "You can be sure that, for [our] part, there will be no aggression of any kind against the Panamanian military bases." Only the United States operates military bases in Panama.

Panama Under Pressure to Initiate Talks

These events come as United States military officials voice increased urgency to begin negotiations to keep a U.S. military presence on the banks of the canal. "We are approaching, in 1997, the drop-dead point on the budget" for a post-1999 military presence, said Air Force Col. Dick O'Connor, who directs the base transfer process for the U.S. Southern Command in Panama. O'Connor told The Miami Herald that "for normal purposes, we're already into the planning window for the year 2000. When you get to the two- or three-year window, it gets tough to find money."

Drug czar General Barry McCaffrey, still fresh from his post as chief of the Southern Command, said on May 16 that the U.S. bases are "very, very important" for the fight against drug trafficking. He claimed that it is up to Panamanians, but that they "have to determine to what extent they see a common purpose in the continuation of the U.S. military presence, [...] to what extent they feel that it benefits them to collaborate with the United States on regional policy and counter-drug and humanitarian aid," McCaffrey said. "Probably two peoples that have had a friendship for 80 years will come to an agreement," he added.

In an April 17 meeting with the Fellowship of Reconciliation and Panamanian human rights leader Father Conrado Sanjur, State Department and White House officials also said they are interested in maintaining bases in order to fight the drug war.

Defense Secretary William Perry and the late former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown each visited Panama in March, leading to speculation that the U.S. might negotiate a free trade agreement with Panama in exchange for a military base extension. But a U.S. official close to the process insisted that "we can't allow that sort of linkage," and that the United States will pay neither rent nor "disguised rent" such as preferential trade with Panama.

The Clinton administration has been discussing keeping military bases in Panama for the last year and a half, but says that the drug war can be conducted from bases in Honduras, Puerto Rico, Florida and Texas. "We really do have the flexibility of acting with or without bases in Panama," a highly placed U.S. military officer told Panamá Update. "If Panama is not interested, we can match that level of interest. It's no problem," the official said.

Drug War is Ineffective

The authorization for military training in April followed other U.S. military exercises in recent months, including in the western Chiriqu' province from March 3 to 10, which used the local David airport. The Navy and Air Force also conducted exercises February 5-7 in Chame, Col-n, San Blas, Penonomé, Santiago, Bocas del Toro, and Barro Colorado Island, and on the Chagres and Chilibre Rivers.

The Southern Command will spend $138 million this year on anti-drug operations, and hopes to increase that budget in 1997 and 1998. A satellite and radar tracking system operated from Howard Air Base in Panama tracks suspected drug flights in neighboring countries, then passes the information to the militaries in Andean countries to chase the planes down. SouthCom officials point with pride to having intercepted or downed 12 drug flights in Colombia and Peru last year. But they also acknowledge that technology allows them to track planes from anywhere.

Yet the international military strategy and the resources poured into it have had no visible effect on either cocaine production or street prices in the United States. Coca leaf cultivation actually increased to a record-breaking 214,800 hectares last year, according to the State Department.

"Perhaps most important," write policy analysts Kenneth Sharpe and Eva Bertram in a recent "memo for the new Drug Czar," "the prices for a pure gram of both heroin and cocaine have declined markedly in the last 15 years, despite the dramatic escalation of drug law enforcement."

The new drug czar himself, Barry McCaffrey, testified in his Senate confirmation hearings that no military, from the United States or anywhere else, has the solution to the drug problem. "Our efforts over the past five or more years have not yet yielded the effect we desired," he said even last year.

McCaffrey's opinions about the drug problem "are neither philosophical nor theoretical," says Roberto Eisenmann, founder of the daily La Prensa. "A military expert like few others has spoken... General McCaffrey spoke clearly, and regarding the rash, anti-historic, unconstitutional and negative (for both countries) idea of U.S. military bases in Panama after December 31, 1999, he has made the final point."

Talks are rumored...
but Panama is busy with other fires

El Panama América reported on March 31 that Foreign Minister Gabriel Lewis Galindo and Ambassador Alberto Guardia met in Venezuela with the State Department's new Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Jeff Davidow, in order to talk informally about a future military base agreement.

Acting Foreign Minister Alberto Arias said the next step will be discussions between the government and political parties in the coming weeks. He said that a possible military presence after 1999 is being treated now more at the internal level by both countries than in bilateral talks. But domestically, the ruling PRD has had its hands full dealing with widespread protests over a proposed amnesty and by pensioners seeking modest increases in benefits.

U.S. officials insist that it is up to Panama whether to negotiate a new military base agreement. In this case, political inertia favors implementation of the Canal Treaties. If Panamanians set their sights on converting the bases to civilian use, the chapter on foreign military bases in Panama may close with the century's end.

Sources: Panamá América, 1/30, 2/29, 3/31, 4/18, 4/19, 5/10/96; La Prensa, 2/4, 2/28, 3/23, 4/11, 4/17, 4/24, 4/30, 5/1, 5/3, 5/17, 5/29/96; Inter-Press Service, 4/9, 4/23, 5/9/96; Reuter, 5/10/96; interviews of U.S. officials, 5/15, 5/29/96; Miami Herald, 5/20/96; El Deber, 4/10/96 [Bolivia]; St. Petersburg Times, 5/27/96. "Memo for the New Drug Czar" is part of briefing packet, Fueling Failure: U.S. International Drug Control Policy, available for $2.50 from the Washington Office on Latin America, 400 C St. N.E., Washington, DC 20002.

Fellowship of Reconciliation
Panama Campaign
Produced by the Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean
2017 Mission St. #305, San Francisco, CA 94110
Tel: (415) 495-6334, Fax: (415) 495-5628, E-mail: forlatam@igc.apc.org>forlatam@igc.apc.org ©2001 Fellowship of Reconciliation

Last updated September 18, 1996.