January/February 2002

Two States For Two Peoples

by Scott Kennedy

It's an unfortunate fact of political life that it is sometimes as costly to be too early with an idea as to be too late. I’ve been reflecting on this reality the past several weeks as events have thrust the Arab-Israeli conflict to center stage in people’s consciousness.

I first traveled to the Middle East in 1968. I lived in Jerusalem for six months. I've traveled to the region more than two dozen times in the past three decades, most recently this past July. My first overtly political visit to the region was in 1975 on a delegation organized by the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Allan Solomonow, who then headed the FOR’s national Middle East program, organized a month-long delegation to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a participation in the FOR delegation, I came to support a "two-state solution" to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. My view was shaped by the conviction that the rights, privileges, and responsibilities enjoyed by one party to the conflict must be afforded the other. Neither party can force a settlement totally to its liking. A negotiated settlement must minimally satisfy the demands of both. Both have a national identity, want their own state, and have a right to lead secure lives and to enjoy fundamental human and civil rights.

The "two-state" approach is certainly not my innovation. The 1947 UN Partition Resolution divided the disputed land into twin states of Palestine and Israel. But Partition was a casualty of the 1948 war by the surrounding Arab nations against the newly founded Jewish State. The Israelis call it the "War of Independence." The Arabs call it al-nakbah, "the Catastrophe." The 1948 ceasefire suspended the fighting for the time being, but brought no sustainable resolution to the conflict. Israel came out of the war with a greater land mass than provided for in the UN Partition Plan. Palestinian land not seized by Israel was occupied by neighboring Jordan and Egypt. While the Jewish people celebrated their new State of Israel, the Palestinian twin was stillborn.

Before we left for the Middle East in 1975, the PLO Ambassador to the UN told us that one cannot have one twin legitimate while the other is illegitimate. Nevertheless, for four decades "three No’s" prevailed in Israeli political discourse: no to Palestinian nationhood ("There is no such thing as a Palestinian"); no to negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization; and no Palestinian state. The Palestinians mirrored the Israeli position: no to Jewish Israelis (Jewish immigrants to Israel had to return to their former homes); no negotiations with Israel; and no Jewish state. (An Arab state covering all of Palestine would supplant "the Zionist Entity.")

As early as 1975, I allied with a small heretical group of Israeli Jews who favored partition and a heroic band of Palestinians advocating a two-state solution. The Israeli Jews were marginalized and ignored by their compatriots. The Palestinians were vilified and sometimes killed by Palestinian nationalist forces that viewed coexistence with Israel as capitulation to Western colonialist settler forces.

The first Palestinian uprising from 1987-1993 changed all that. A massive and largely nonviolent civil insurrection demonstrated to most Israelis that the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was unsustainable. The Palestinian National Movement in turn recognized that Israeli would not be eliminated. The two-state solution, or partition, reemerged as the overarching rubric for a political settlement.

The Palestinian National Council, or parliament-in-exile, retroactively endorsed the UN Partition Resolution rejected in 1947. Direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel in the Madrid peace talks and Oslo Accords in 1993 resulted in mutual recognition and a commitment to seek diplomatic resolution.

Unfortunately, the ensuing years produced few of the benefits anticipated by Oslo. Given growing frustration among Palestinians, few observers were surprised at the outbreak of violence in September 2000. Despite ongoing violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the political ground previously gained has not been lost. The Palestinian national movement still supports two states. Even Israeli Prime Minister Sharon supports a Palestinian state, though of a nature and geographical configuration acceptable to few Palestinians.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict used to be viewed as a zero-sum game: Israeli security was based on denial of Palestinian freedom, and Palestinian freedom would be won at the expense of Israeli security. Now it is widely acknowledged that Israeli security and Palestinian freedom are mutually dependent and reinforcing.

Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery argues that the parameters for an eventual resolution to the conflict are well established. Israel must withdraw to 1967 borders, with minor land swaps agreeable to both parties. Jewish settlements must be removed from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An undivided Jerusalem will serve as the capital of both states with, in President Clinton’s words, Jewish parts of the city under Jewish municipal control and Arab sectors governed by the Palestinians. The Palestinian refugees will be allowed to return to their homes over a period of years, with the actual number negotiated between the two parties, or to receive compensation

Ten or twenty years ago, some people considered those of us advocating for a Palestinian state to be anti-Israel or even anti-Semitic. We now find ourselves in strange company with President Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon supporting creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Diplomacy is "the art of delaying the inevitable." Continued violence by Israelis and Palestinians futilely attempts to deny the inevitable. The two-state solution is the only alternative short of the wholesale slaughter of Palestinians, Israelis, or both.

In 1947, the UN established the legal and moral foundation for a peace settlement. Both Israelis and Palestinians have made many mistakes since then, but the high cost of the current impasse is apparent to all. All that has been lacking is the political will.

In the aftermath of September 11, growing US support for a Palestinian state may be a silver lining in those tragic events. A diplomatic solution would reduce the violence and set both nations on a common course—building a new Middle East , addressing the shared concerns of economic development, water resources, environmental protection, and regional security.

This change is the basis for hope shared by those of us who have long struggled for two peoples in two states with a common future.       

Scott Kennedy, chair of the FOR National Council, coordinates the Middle East Program of the Resource Center for Nonviolence and serves on the Santa Cruz City Council.

©2001 Fellowship of Reconciliation