July 2008 Colombia Peace Presence Update
In this Update:
- Letter from the Field: Inside a Child’s Memory
- Celebration and Caution: Regarding the Release of Hostages
- Action Alert: Tell Congress Not to Fund More War
- July 20 Marches Reject Kidnapping by Guerrillas
- Banana Executive Admits Participation in Peace Community Massacres
- Report on the Observer Mission of the Human Rights Situation in Bajo Putumayo
Letter from the Field: Inside a child’s Memory
By Chris Courtheyn
The school in La Unión is divided into two classes: one for the smaller children, and another for those age eight and up. The two teachers walk up from Apartadó each Monday morning to La Unión and stay until Friday afternoon. One day I went to see what the classes were like and stayed for the older group’s morning lesson. It started with everyone in a circle, holding hands, and each person sharing something for which they were thankful. After getting over their shyness, the children expressed thanks for clean air, food, their families, and their minds that enable them to think.
Next, the teacher started an activity called “My Life and Significant Experiences.” First, the teacher had them each write down their name, parents’ names, when and where they were born, etc. Then they were instructed to come up with a significant life experience and write about it.
Like children anywhere, it took some work to motivate them to write about a memory. To give them an example, the teacher shared her story walking up to La Unión for the first time. She explained how the hike wore her out, she got sick along the way, but once she arrived and saw the school, she overflowed with excitement. The school buildings were nothing like the cramped classrooms in Apartadó— Located in beautiful surroundings, the large rooms had big windows allowing in tons of fresh air and sunlight; she thought to herself, “what a great place to teach.”
At that point, the kids began writing down their stories. Many of the memories were typical of children in many places: a certain birthday, their First Communion, or getting lost in the city— However, other stories illustrated particular aspects of growing up in La Unión.
For example, one boy told of a time he went with his mother to gather lulo fruit, and that a duende (“dwarf”) threw a rock at them. These “mythical” dwarfs are a widespread fear here and are blamed for strange happenings. When the teacher asked if he actually saw the duende, he responded “no, but the rock came from above—” The teacher tried to get me to support her skepticism regarding the actual existence of these dwarfs, but I replied, “While I haven’t seen any myself either, people here say that they exist, and I can’t say whether they are truly real or not.” The Colombian countryside really is a world of its own, where many things are possible.
Unfortunately, these many realities include other serious experiences of fear. One child shared the story of the arrival of military in La Unión, threatening them and forcing everyone to displace to San José. Another memory was a recollection of the 2000 massacre, when paramilitaries rounded up people of La Unión and killed six community members and leaders. A third told of paramilitaries threatening her and her family, forcing them out of their house, although fortunately in this case no one was hurt.
In all, one-third of the stories recounted were memories of fear due to the armed conflict. Since the founding of the Peace Community, community leaders have stressed how memory itself is one of their fundamental values. Further, the dignity felt by all members of the community is linked to this collected remembrance of their history, including not only amazing accomplishments but also intense challenges and losses.
From the innocent perspectives of the children, the recollections brought forth in the school truly encapsulate the intense imprint of fear left on the community after suffering so many aggressions and human rights abuses. One can only hope that through the continuing work of the Peace Community, the next generation of children in La Unión is not tainted with these same deplorable memories of threats, displacement and massacres.
Regarding the Release of Colombian and American Hostages:
A Note of Celebration and Caution
Natalia Cardona is the Peacebuilding Unit’s Senior Associate for Latin America and the Caribbean at the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
The news that 15 hostages held by the FARC in Colombia were freed on July 2 came as both a surprise and a great relief. Their freedom and wellbeing was celebrated around the world.
Having seen the disturbing footage of these same hostages when the FARC’s proofs of life were intercepted earlier this year, everyone rejoiced at their freedom when it was revealed. Greater joy was brought on by the fact that the operation went off without escalating the violence or leading to a full-scale massacre. Watching the videos of the captives, including Ingrid Betancourt and the three hostages from the United States, as they were united with their families was surely a reason to celebrate. No one should be held hostage or be treated so cruelly.
But the celebratory tones are muted by the fact that the FARC still holds 700 hostages and hundreds more are being held or were disappeared for political reasons by paramilitary groups with close ties to the
U.S. funded Colombian army responds violently to peaceful protest against Plan Colombia and the Free Trade Agreement. Photo: Association of Indigenous Townships of Northern Cauca (ACIN)Colombian military and government officials. Moreover, recent reports put into question whether this operation actually happened in the way the Colombian government describes.
Colombia is still facing severe problems related to its 50-year-old conflict. Ongoing paramilitary, military and guerrilla violence and massive economic inequalities compound the problems and force many of the poorest to grow coca in order to survive. U.S. policy towards Colombia, including Plan Colombia and U.S. Colombia FTA, are misdirected and only add to the social unrest.
Details of this operation will surely be revealed in years to come but the following is a summary of what has been reported thus far. This synopsis should give us some food for thought as we examine the release of the hostages and some of the celebratory and cautionary notes surrounding this event.
The official report from the Colombian government is that they were able to obtain the release of the hostages by infiltrating the FARC unit that was holding them and its secretariat and posing as a humanitarian mission that was to move the hostages to another FARC camp.
Other versions of what happened to obtain the hostages’ release
Recent reports have arisen from Swiss media stating that the rescue was staged and not a masterful military operation, as was previously noted by Colombian officials. Reportedly $20 million was paid to the FARC, and one of the hostage’s guards was pressured through his wife in order to facilitate the release, with intensive involvement of the United States in making the deal. Dominique Moisi, a leading foreign policy expert in France, pointed to this Swiss report as a probability. And French media have raised questions about the relatively good health of the hostages especially given the haggard appearance of Betancourt in the last proof of life video. The French media suggested that the hostages were given food and medicine in preparation for their return.
Today the Colombian government denies the reports and accuses Jean Pierre Gontard of being the source of the Swiss media report. Gontard, with the Colombian government's permission, has represented Switzerland in previous efforts to broker a peace agreement with FARC rebels and was trying to broker a deal for Betancourt’s release before the operation occurred. The Colombian government is also accusing Gontard of transporting money for the FARC in an effort that is seen by many as a way to draw attention to the ”˜failures’ of those who try to obtain the release of these hostages through negotiation.
What of Israeli Involvement?
Another version of the story points to Israeli involvement in the release. Haaretz.com has reported that Israeli security companies were involved in providing advice and equipment to the Colombian government. According to Haaretz, the Israeli activity involved dozens of Israeli security experts, and was coordinated by Global CST, which is owned by former General Staff operations chief, Brigadier General (res.) Israel Ziv, and Brigadier (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser. Asked about the Israeli involvement in the operation Ziv said there is "no need to exaggerate." "We don't want to take credit for something we didn't do," a company source added. "We helped them prepare themselves to fight terror. We helped them to plan operations and strategies and develop intelligence sources. That's quite a bit, but shouldn't be taken too far." Global CST won a $10 million contract to work with the Colombian government at the suggestion of the Israeli government.
The White House released a statement acknowledging the CIA and the National Security Agency were involved in providing intelligence and equipment for the operation. However, the Colombian government stated that this operation was strictly a Colombian operation.
What were the three United States citizens who were kidnapped doing in Colombia?
The three Americans””Marc Goncalves, Thomas Howes and Keith Stansell””worked for Northrop Grumman doing surveillance of coca plantations as part of the U.S.’ failed Plan Colombia. Though the program operated under the authority of the U.S. Southern Command””and included work for the CIA, DEA, and State Department—several Defense Department agencies oversaw different aspects of the program including maintenance, surveillance equipment and data gathering, and more than 12 corporations were involved in outfitting the planes. But no one took responsibility once the contractors were kidnapped. John McQuaid, of the Huffington Post, writes that the program was embedded in a net of institutions but it operated on its own with minimal oversight. Once trouble hit and the three contractors were kidnapped, the institutional netting broke. The company was quick to pass these gentlemen’s portfolios and program to a shell corporation as soon as they were kidnapped””CIAO— and Southern Command did not take any responsibility until the 3 men were released recently. This case points to broader problems with government contracting, especially in terms of holding these private military companies accountable for their actions abroad and accountable to their employees.
“The Man Ingrid Hugged”
General Montoya the man Ingrid Betancourt hugged and thanked for her release has an extremely controversial record. According to an IPS article Montoya’s record includes previous oversight of the 24th Brigade which the U.S. State Department reported had links to paramilitary groups at La Hormiga, in the Department of Putumayo, where a gravesite of more than 100 civilians killed by these same paramilitaries was discovered in 2001. In March 2007, an intelligence report produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was leaked to the Los Angeles Times and it indicated that Montoya and a paramilitary group known as Bloque Cacique Nutibara "jointly planned and conducted a military operation in 2002 to eliminate Marxist guerrillas from poor areas around Medellin, a city in northwestern Colombia that has been a centre of the drug trade." According to the IPS article Operation Orion began at 2:00 a.m. on Oct. 15, 2002 in Medellín's 13th district. At least 14 people were killed, and residents and human rights organizations testified that about 50 more "disappeared" in the following weeks. And on Oct. 21 of that year the presidential web site featured a statement by Montoya saying that "we will continue, and what we are doing in the 13th district is a message to the violent, telling them: desist, we will go everywhere in the country because urban guerrilla warfare has no place in Colombia."
Certainly the Colombian army should be recognized for their efforts. Yet questions regarding their behavior and previous actions must not be ignored. One successful mission cannot erase a history of human rights violations at the hands of the army which in many cases works in tandem with paramilitary death squads.
The Current Political Crises
The operation took place amid a growing political crisis for President Uribe and his administration. The release of these hostages occurred on the heels of a ruling by the Colombian Supreme court that Yidis Medina, a Colombian congresswoman whose vote was key in passing a law which allowed for President Uribe to be reelected in 2006, was bought by promises of political favors. President Uribe has gone as far as to call the Supreme Court a supporter of terror and is proposing a referendum to right the wrong of his election having been made possible by an illegal act. This presidential proposal has drawn criticism from many sectors who are calling for the President to respect Colombia’s institutions. Many see this step as a maneuver by President Uribe to set the stage for a third run at the presidency. This news also comes amidst the growing parapolitical scandal which links more than 60 congressional representatives to the right wing paramilitary death squads and has led to the arrest of 33 Congress members most of whom are Uribe supporters.
What does this mean for the FARC?
The FARC has suffered many blows in the past few years. Among these losses are the recent operation that led to the release of Ingrid Betancourt; the death of three of its secretariat members; the “misplacement” of the son of Clara Rojas’ (Ingrid Betancourt’s vice-presidential running mate who was also kidnapped),who was discovered by the Colombian government in an orphanage; and the death of 11 deputies whom they were holding hostage. Some point to these setbacks as the beginning of the end for the FARC. Others note that the FARC’s extensive profits from the drug trade will certainly keep it alive. They say it will continue to exist though perhaps not in the same way it does now, especially given that the FARC lacks support among Colombians.
Despite the weakening of the FARC many, including Fidel Castro are today calling for a negotiated solution to the conflict and they insist it is the only way to solve the problems Colombia is facing. And Ingrid Betancourt has added her voice by encouraging the Colombian government to end its “vocabulary of hate” against her former captors. “At some point we must speak with the people we hate,” she stated during an interview with BBC.
What about the U.S.””Colombia FTA and Plan Colombia?
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has stood her ground on stopping the U.S. Colombia FTA from going to a vote. While she extended her congratulations to the Colombian government for a successful operation and the release of the hostages Ms. Pelosi has come under criticism for requiring that more work be done to ensure that Colombian union leader’s rights do not continue to be violated.
Some political analysts have pointed to this operation as a signal to fund Plan Colombia but in a different way, stating that what has worked in the past will not work now. However, they forget that Plan Colombia was originally intended to reduce the amount of cocaine entering the U.S. from Colombia by 50%. Plan Colombia has failed to do that, and in 2007 the UN reported that coca growth had increased by 27%. Moreover, it is important to remember the Colombian military’s abusive human rights record and their ties to the paramilitary death squads. Forgetting Plan Colombia’s initial goals is a mistake on the part of these analysts but forgetting the Colombian army’s record and the current political and historical economic crisis is a recipe for disaster. It is clear, as a Boston Globe article stated on July 5, that no one rescue mission will solve all of these problems.
For more FOR analysis of the hostage rescue, see the Rockland County News op-ed by John Lindsay-Poland, published July 14.
Action Alert: Tell Congress Not to Fund More War in Colombia
The House and Senate Appropriations committees are scheduled to consider foreign aid bills before Congress recesses in August, and they are under steep pressure to fund more war in Colombia. Contact Congressional appropriators today to urge them to not to cave in to the call to continue funding an ineffective strategy and an army that kills with impunity.
On July 17, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, which funds most of Plan Colombia, approved a bill that “continues the realignment of Plan Colombia assistance to focus on institution-building and alternative development,” according to the panel’s press release. The Senate version moved about $8 million from military to non-military programs in the Colombia package compared to last year, when Congress cut more than $170 million from military aid, most of it transferred to non-military aid. However, the Senate bill still maintains nearly $300 million in military aid, not including an estimate $126 million in aid from the Defense Department.
That’s a lot of cash for a program that’s done nothing to stop the production of cocaine and supports an army that kills hundreds of civilians a year. But Democrats are under heavy pressure from
Tell Congressional leaders the United States should end support for such violence.
Click here to send a letter to the chairs of congressional appropriations committees.
July 20 Marches Reject Kidnapping by Guerrillas
Millions of Colombians in dozens of cities in Colombia marched on July 20, to celebrate Colombia’s independence and to reject the practice of kidnapping by FARC guerrillas. The marches were a massive outpouring of civil society against a pernicious form of violence.
The symbolism of the grito de independencia —as Colombia’s independence celebration is known — was used very effectively: in 1810, the people rose up and shouted their independence from the oppressive Spaniards. 198 years later, the people rose up and shouted freedom from the FARC. The combination of patriotism and music ””Shakira, Carlos Vives, Juanes— was also very effective: world-known Colombian artists are credited by Colombians with countering the negative reputation that the country has abroad (linked to drug trafficking) and are therefore a source of pride and patriotism.
Yet much of the analysis of the July 20 events projects a one-dimensional view of the conflict, as if the FARC were the only armed actor. There is the assumption that the demobilization of the paramilitary was a success. “The negotiations with paramilitaries, in spite of all the mistakes made, not only ended the coalition of illegal groups that attacked the State, but gave rise to a process of truth that was unprecedented in the country,” wrote the weekly Semana.
After the military strikes of recent months, there is also a wide perception, ””influenced by the media””particularly among urban population that the Colombian army is finally winning the war against FARC.
Hidden behind the emphasis on kidnapping, a practice that people are demanding that the FARC end, are other serious impacts of the conflict on the civilian population, including acts committed by FARC itself. Even more invisible from the collective consciousness are attacks on civilians by the Army —especially in the form of extrajudicial killings”” and by the re-organized paramilitaries. Mainstream media barely reported the latest union leader to be killed, Guillermo Rivera, who was found dead with signs of torture 84 days after he went missing. Security cameras showed several police cars were present at the time and place where the leader disappeared. Human rights groups this month released data showing that the Army killed 347 civilians in 2007, an increase of 59% from two years ago.
Meanwhile, reports the Washington Post, President Uribe “has recently signaled that the government's negotiating position — should FARC commanders decide to talk — has hardened considerably, leaving the guerrillas with little chance of demanding concessions. The possibility of a demilitarized zone, a longtime rebel stipulation for talks, is now unlikely, as is international mediation by such figures as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, whom the guerrillas considered an ideological partner.”
Banana Executive Admits Participation in Peace Community Massacres
Raul Hasbun, alias Pedro Bonito, a banana plantation owner turned paramilitary chieftain, gave preliminary testimony in Medellin about his participation in several massacres, including against the Peace Community. Massacres were a practice to ensure control of perceived guerrilla0controlled areas, and were seen as a mean to do business in the Uraba region. In his preliminary testimony on July 23, Hasbun implicated the former Army Fourth Brigade commander, General Alfonso Manosalva Florez, and said paramilitary meetings occurred at the brigade headquarters.
Report on the Observer Mission of the Human Rights Situation in Bajo Putumayo
Bogotá, June 2008
By Marcela Ceballos and Carlos Duarte
This report indicates the main current risk factors for the inhabitants of the department of Putumayo, and concludes by identifying three different types of factors: (1) An absence of guarantees of legal security, for a dignified existence, for the exercise of individual liberties and the defense of human rights; (2) Impediments to communities' ability to remain in their territories; (3) Direct persecution of residents and community leaders, and the "invisibilization" of the armed conflict's victims.
In the first aspect we found a situation of generalized fear. The majority of victims of sociopolitical violence, and of inhabitants in general, abstain from making public denunciations for fear of possible retaliations from the victimizers. This fear is mediated by distrust of institutions that have been under pressure from, and in some cases infiltrated by, members of illegal armed groups. This situation reaches critical levels in San Miguel municipality [in Putumayo's southwest corner, across the river from Ecuador], and results in a context of impunity and precariousness of the protection of fundamental rights. The presence of illegal armed groups — guerrillas and paramilitaries — worsens the situation. The national government's Democratic Consolidation policy, based on the Integrated Action Doctrine and implemented through the Strategy of Social Recovery of Territory, increased the civilian population's risk levels, since it dilutes the distinction between civilians and combatants. In addition, it is concentrating state intervention and humanitarian aid within the armed forces, weakening local governance and militarizing relations between the state and civil society.
In the second aspect, forced displacement and the militarization of indigenous reservations and protected areas, as well as regions with abundant exploitable resources, favor unregulated economic intervention in the department. The presence of oil companies that have been granted concessions, as well as the campesinos' incorporation in the productive chain, have deepened without any corresponding investment in social needs or infrastructure. Nor does it respect the principle of previous consultation, and goes against the "life plans" of the social organizations and indigenous peoples that inhabit this territory. THe absence of alternatives either to this development model or to coca-growing affects the ability of towns, communities, families and inhabitants in general to survive with dignity. This situation presents itself from the towns of Teteyé to Puerto Vega (in the rural zone of Puerto Asís municipality) and in indigenous territories (the Siona people's Buenavista reservation and others, such as Santa Rosa del Guamuéz, that make up the Cofán people's "Permanent Table"). Intense fumigation and forced manual eradication are affecting health, the environment and food security for the population in general, without mechanisms of compensation or reparation for damages caused by this strategy's indiscriminate effects. Women are victims of diverse strategies of the armed groups, who convert their bodies into a "spoil of war" and a "resource for war." Young people find themselves amid multiple pressures and before the absence of opportunities to develop their life projects; their futures are uncertain.
In the third aspect, we find a situation of permanent stigmatization of leaders who oppose the models of economic and military intervention described above; to guerrilla pressures for recruitment and the incorporation of young people in their ranks; to threats and murders by groups that, it appears, are in a process of rearmament in the zone around San Miguel municipality and some areas of Valle del Guamuez municipality. These factors impede the "visilibization" of the armed conflict's victims, while the government's reparations policy, though it has not yet established itself, proposes an economic dimension — a small one — but not a clarification of what happened nor any advance in justice. In this sense, the existence of a large number of mass graves in the department, without a process of identification of remains or identification of those responsible, shows the need to consider this dimension to be part of a policy of strengthening justice in Colombia.
Despite all of this, the organizations we interviewed insist on resisting their disappearance and their forced displacement. They have decided to remain in the territory that belongs to them and they have chosen civility and the peaceful way to resolve their conflicts, even though they find themselves in a context in which war is habitual. They have build life plans and projects that aim for integral and human development (Cofán people's Life Plan, Integral Plan for Campesino Development of the Departmental Table of Social Organizations, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Plan of ACSOMAYO, among other initiatives). They continue defending autonomy and liberty as bases for the building of conditions for a dignified life, and they persist in a dialogue with the national government, although in their relationships with institutions, on occasion, they have been stigmatized, silenced, ignored and even harassed. We dedicate this document to them and manifest our admiration. We hope that the international community's support will also take into account this universe, because from below and from civil society are built the bases of democracy and peace, as well as the long-lasting conditions for human rights protection.
Final text edited by Marcela Cebalos, María Isabel Casas and Carolina Rojas.
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