It’s Time to End the War in Afghanistan

by David Wildman

Each day, some 850 Afghan children die from largely preventable deaths: diarrhea, tuberculosis, malnutrition, unsafe drinking water. An Afghan woman dies related to childbirth every 30 minutes. Afghanistan now has the highest infant mortality and second highest maternal mortality rates in the world. One-quarter of Afghan children will not reach the age of five, and life expectancy for Afghans is only 44 years.

In its first year, the Obama administration addressed the urgent situation in Afghanistan by dramatically increasing resources allocated there. In 2010, U.S. spending in Afghanistan will increase by over $50 billion. Since 2001, the U.S. has devoted almost $300 billion to Afghanistan. Almost none of it has gone to basic healthcare or education. Nearly 98% of U.S. funds go to military spending: to U.S. soldiers, to massive profits for U.S. defense companies, to high-paid private security contractors, and to training and arming Afghan soldiers and police. Are all these billions in military spending the best way to help Afghan women and children dying each day from lack of healthcare?

By all accounts, 2009 was the bloodiest year since U.S. troops invaded in 2001. The number of Afghan civilians killed and wounded last year rose to nearly 6,000. The three greatest causes of civilian casualties are anti-government planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide attacks and U.S. airstrikes. All three are closely linked with the presence of foreign troops in an area. When NATO troops enter an area like Marjah in Helmand, the number of IEDs and suicide attacks invariably go up. Robert Papes, an expert on the causes of suicide terrorism, testified in October to Congress, “The picture is clear, the more Western troops have gone to Afghanistan, the more local residents have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation — and are using suicide and other terrorism to resist it.”

For U.S. troops, 36% of those killed and one-half of all wounded in Afghanistan have occurred since President Obama took office. Most of these came since General McChrystal launched major counterinsurgency offensives in Helmand. With escalating violence, far fewer Afghan refugees returned in 2009 than any year since 2002. Meanwhile, the number of internally displaced persons fleeing war nearly doubled to 275,000.

Yet U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan did not begin in October 2001, when a small number of U.S. Special Forces invaded and provided arms to brutal warlords of the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from power. It was more than two decades earlier, on July 3, 1979, when President Carter authorized a covert campaign of arming and training Afghan militants fighting against their government. This was nearly six months before Soviet forces entered the country in December 1979. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, later acknowledged, “[I]n my opinion, this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention” (interviewed in La Nouvelle Observateur January 15-21, 1998). Brzezinski believed that a prolonged military occupation would demoralize the army, bankrupt their economy, and divide their society.

Under President Reagan, arming mujahadeen groups fighting foreign occupation forces in Afghanistan soon became the largest covert operation in world history. Many of these same armed groups (Heckmatyar, Haqqani, the Taliban) are still fighting against foreign occupation, only now it is against U.S. forces.

Over the past 30 years, billions of dollars in weapons pumped into Afghanistan by the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others have devastated the country. Most Afghans have never known a time without war, but they do know that good health, education, and peace will not come from more war.

At the same time, many in the United States still accept the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan as a legitimate response to 9/11/01. The Obama administration continues the Bush administration’s “war on terror” rhetoric that Afghanistan is the “good war.” Sadly, the words of Congresswoman Barbara Lee eight years ago still apply today: “If we rush to launch a counterattack, we run too great a risk that women, children, and other noncombatants will be caught in the crossfire— Finally we must be careful not to embark on an open-ended war with neither an exit strategy nor a focused target. We cannot repeat past mistakes. As a member of the clergy so eloquently said, ”˜As we act, let us not become the evil that we deplore.’” (U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee, September 15, 2001).

Let’s examine some of the arguments for escalation and why we instead need a swift military exit strategy as the only path to peace.

Military and political leaders as well as pundits widely acclaimed a rapid surge in the number of U.S. troops in early 2007 as the reason for a significant decline in violence in Iraq. The U.S. military and government now want to apply this counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Yet several key aspects of the surge are rarely analyzed. The U.S. military started talking with the Sunni militia, and they started paying militias not to kill U.S. troops. A recent U.S. military study, “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” describes aid as a “nonlethal weapon” to buy “hearts and minds” — military-speak for bribes.

In effect, the unstated goals of U.S. strategy are: (1) to militarize problem solving by giving credit to the military for the impact of negotiations and bribes; (2) to restore credibility and legitimacy to the U.S. military in a context where it is seen as losing an untenable fight; and (3) to wage a public relations war to build domestic U.S. public support for ongoing military spending in the name of protecting civilians.

Twenty faces are hurt by one slap. (Afghan proverb)

General McChrystal repeatedly says that reducing civilian casualties is a top priority and has reduced airstrikes in Afghanistan — the cause of most U.S.-inflicted casualties. Yet the U.S. has dramatically escalated drone strikes in Pakistan. From 2004-07 there were ten drone strikes in Pakistan. The number of drone assassination attempts jumped to 36 in 2008 (roughly one every ten days) and 53 in 2009 (one every seven days). In the first two months of 2010, there were already 17 strikes (a rate of one every 3.5 days).

The American Civil Liberties Union is challenging the legal basis and justification of drone assassinations in countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia where the United States is not at war. When the CIA and other U.S. personnel were linked with similar killings in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines, the perpetrators were called “death squads.” Now the killers commute to offices in Nevada and Florida. They use computers, video cameras, and remote controls, rather than machine guns. Philip Alston, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings, has urged a full investigation into drone attacks.

Given the number of civilian casualties connected with drone strikes, they also violate principles in international law of distinction (between combatants and noncombatants) and proportionality. Pakistani sources report drone strikes killed over 700 civilians in 2009 alone. They are widely resented by Pakistanis and serve as powerful recruiting tool for armed opposition groups.

An immediate end to drone strikes will save lives and take away a powerful recruiting tool for armed groups.

Protecting the Afghan people

Certainly this is a noble goal, and one that General McChrystal has argued depends on the presence of U.S. troops. The first step in counterinsurgency is to “clear” an area of insurgents. As 15,000 U.S. and Afghan forces swept into the Marjah region in February, the stated goal was to protect the civilian population, not kill terrorists or insurgents. Since the United States announced its plan to protect it, the region has had more mines and IEDs planted than ever before. This is the third time that NATO forces have “taken” Marjah. Each previous time, the Taliban waited and returned. In one instance, the Afghan police who were brought in were so corrupt the people threw them out even before the Taliban returned.

In reality, the United States is waging a public relations campaign that “protecting people” will win U.S. public support for advancing U.S. military goals. Yet clearing an area means more foreign troops, more night raids, and more checkpoints. Even McChrystal admitted recently that with more checkpoints, “We have shot an amazing number of people, but to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be a threat” (The New York Times, March 27, 2010).

Most Afghans, like most military analysts, know that al Qaida is no longer in Afghanistan but operates primarily in Pakistan. One of the surest ways to escalate violence and endanger Afghan communities is to increase foreign troop presence in an area. The Taliban rely heavily on IEDs, bombings of government buildings and foreign troops in market places, which invariably lead to greater civilian casualties — both from insurgent attacks and U.S. strikes. How does the U.S. military expect to build trust with Afghan communities when their very presence increases instability?

By contrast, when U.S. forces leave it can lead to stability and weakening of the Taliban. After a deadly Taliban attack last year, the United States withdrew all its bases in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan. Lt. Colonel Robert Brown, the U.S. commander there explained, “If you pull out the coalition forces, you open the natural seams between the traditional leaders and the Johnny-come-lately Taliban” (“Rebels Seek Reconciliation as US Pulls Back,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2010). Now the Taliban are being challenged by the local shura (village leadership) in Kamdesh without a shot being fired.

Training and increasing Afghan army & national police

Proponents of U.S. military escalation also advocate substantial increases in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) as a means of holding an area. Yet the Afghan government has no capacity to pay for current levels, let alone a major increase. Thus Afghanistan will be forced to be a foreign-dependent militia state for years to come. Large centralized army and police forces drain away resources from critical infrastructure and civilian development needs. Years ago, the 1994 U.N. Human Development Report on “Human Security” documented that the higher the ratio of military to non-military government spending was in a country, the more unstable and the more vulnerable its people were to lack of health and education.

The police are one of the greatest sources of corruption and extortion that create insecurity for many local communities. From 2002-09, the United States spent $6 billion on training by private security contractors like Dyncorp and Blackwater — much of it unaccounted for. Of the 170,000 Afghans trained, only 30,000 remain on the police force. How will billions more in training funds end corruption and enhance accountability of both U.S. contractors and police to local communities? Why not put funding into Afghan-led training of health workers and educators — many of whom are women?

Civilian-military cooperation: “force multiplier” or deadly cooptation?

Counterinsurgency strategies of “clear, hold, build” require greatly increased use of reconstruction projects, aid agencies and NGOs as “force multipliers” for a military agenda. Already the United Nations, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other large government-run aid agencies travel only with armed escorts because they are seen as taking sides. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross/ Red Crescent and small NGOs are willing to do humanitarian work in a completely impartial way that refuses to take sides. As the United States seeks to bring aid agencies into the service of military ends, it endangers aid workers (both Afghan and international) and local communities.

Most U.S. reconstruction funding currently goes through the Pentagon to training, equipping, and arming the Afghan army and national police. The next largest segment goes to road construction, which serves primarily a military strategy of speeding access to remote areas. Construction contracts are also a source for bribes and handing out jobs. Colonial powers, since the days of the Roman empire, have long used roads in an attempt to control populations beyond urban centers. Yet roads without additional forms of economic development are little help to rural communities with no electricity and few jobs besides subsistence farming.

Military-linked reconstruction projects often spark popular resentment at foreign presence, fuel recruits for the Taliban insurgency, and endanger communities. Many schools were attacked and forced to close in 2009. Schools built or visited by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) or run by the government were more likely to be targeted than ones run by NGOs. While the United States promised it would deliver schools once its troops had cleared an area, local shura in Helmand negotiated with local Taliban leaders to reopen 105 schools. The best safeguard for schools are local “school support councils” comprised of parents and community members who talk directly with the Taliban — not foreign or even Afghan armed forces.

Withdrawing U.S. forces is the best way to insure complete separation of development and humanitarian work from military actions in order to safe guard Afghan communities, teachers, and humanitarian workers.

Proponents of escalating U.S. troops argue that it will strengthen the legitimate central government. But with widespread election fraud, U.S. forces are seen by Afghans as propping up a highly corrupt, discredited, and illegitimate administration. Afghans understand far better than those of us in the West that democracy works from the bottom up. They have never had a strong central government, but instead have relied on local tribal elders, or shura, who are most accountable to the local community. Years of civil war have greatly weakened and disrupted the role of local shura.

In 2009, Afghanistan ranked second-to-last on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception index. The U.S./NATO controls roughly two-thirds of the Afghan government budget, and international donors provide nearly 90% of all government funding. Charges of Afghan government corruption mask an even greater lack of accountability of international donor agencies and security contractors. U.S. commanders through the Commander’s Emergency Reconstruction Program spend more money than the Ministries of Health, Education, and Agriculture combined. Such a top-down, foreign-driven, militarized approach is not a solution to restoring local community control. Europeans and others providing troops recognize this and are likely to begin withdrawing troops — leaving the United States increasingly isolated. The Dutch government collapsed over its continued troop involvement.

The Taliban, as an Afghan nationalist movement, have made many tactical alliances with local community leaders that preserve a degree of local control against corrupt, outside influence. The Taliban came to power so swiftly in 1990s because they were not seen as corrupt. They now have parallel courts and governing systems in 33 of 34 provinces. While the United States tries to buy local community support with military presence and big reconstruction projects, the insurgents understand that relationships forged over cups of tea with local shura will bring more respect and popular support. Even General Petraeus acknowledged the long-term effectiveness of such Taliban tactics: “As important as they are in achieving security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in counterinsurgency. Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve their strategic objectives.”

As military actions escalate, more casualties and more detainees fuel more resistance to U.S. forces. In 2009, the prison population in Afghanistan increased by 26.5% to 15,686, and is nearly 3.5 times larger than in 2004. The torture and abuse of prisoners in Guantanamo and at Bagram airbase has already stirred Afghan anger against U.S. troops. Closing Bagram prison would be a much better confidence building measure.

In asymmetrical, guerilla warfare, no amounts of sophisticated weaponry, no amounts of military funding or increases in troops will bring peace to Afghans. Yet Afghans do know that while the heavens will remain, foreign rulers will leave.

It’s time for the United States to announce an end to war spending and a swift military exit as the only appropriate and viable humanitarian strategy, and as the best way to bring everyone to the table.

In November 2009, seventy-nine United Methodist bishops from Africa, Europe, Philippines, and across the United States sent an open letter to President Obama calling for “a timetable for the withdrawal of all coalition forces by the end of 2010.” The letter went on, “We believe there is no path to military victory in Afghanistan. We believe that human values must outweigh military claims as governments determine their priorities.”

Public opposition in most countries with coalition troops has grown steadily.

Afghanistan’s 2009 Gross Domestic Product was $13.4 billion. At $1 million/year per U.S. soldier, 30,000 additional troops costs $30 billion per year. That amount is roughly 2.5 times larger than the whole economy of Afghanistan. It could create 600,000 decent jobs in the United States. How many U.S. and Afghan lives might be saved if that money went to healthcare and jobs rather than war?

Over the past year, hundreds of community groups have held screenings of the film Rethink Afghanistan or have hosted Afghan speakers to discuss how to end the war. Local groups can set up an event, or find out about upcoming ones, by visiting www.rethinkafghanistan.com. One of the most compelling segments in the documentary, for local communities, addresses the “Costs of War.” Half of all U.S. income taxes go to war spending and the United States devotes more to war spending than the rest of the world combined.

The Obama administration wants over $100 billion for war in Afghanistan in 2011. The National Priorities Project (www.nationalpriorities.org) provides data on how much money is taken from each state or city for war spending and what that might pay for in terms of jobs, healthcare, education, etc. In every local organizing event, we need to use National Priorities data to make local connections between high unemployment and massive war spending, between cuts in public education and the $4 billion the military spends on recruiting. We need a public option for health care, not for warfare. Mayors, local faith congregations, and union locals are beginning to come together to demand that tax dollars be redirected to meeting human needs and not to war in Afghanistan. A few members of Congress are listening, but it will take a lot more organizing to cut off war funding.

Afghans have a saying that “You cannot carry two watermelons with one hand.” Ending war spending and transforming today’s swords into plowshares may be more like carrying 20 watermelons — we will do it when we build strong alliances with labor, with faith communities, with women’s organizations, and with students.

In October 1989, I met two Soviet veterans from the nine-year war in Afghanistan. The Fellowship of Reconciliation helped these Soviet vets connect with U.S. veterans who had faced a similar trauma when they returned from Vietnam. How will Afghans and U.S. veterans learn from and support one another as they seek to rebuild their lives, reconnect with their society, and come to terms with the ravages of war left behind in a foreign land?

The U.S. war in Afghanistan soon will surpass the length of the Soviet occupation as well as become the longest war in U.S. history. In the years to come, Afghans, U.S. veterans, and all of us face the same challenges of reconciling and restoring.

David Wildman is executive secretary for human rights and racial justice with the United Methodist Church’s General Board of Global Ministries. He travels frequently to Afghanistan and the Middle East. With Phyllis Bennis, Wildman is co-author of the new book Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer (2010, Olive Branch Press/ Interlink Publishing).